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CRIMINAL LAW—THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: EXAMINING
THE PHYSICAL RESTRAINT SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”),
“physically restrained” is defined as “the forcible restraint of the victim such
as being tied, bound, or locked up.”1 For many years, this broad definition2
has been a headache to apply when a defendant is convicted of Hobbs Act
robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951.3 This is because Chapter Two of the
Guidelines allows prosecutors to increase4 the convicted defendant’s “base
offense level”5 by two points if the defendant had physically restrained a
victim to “facilitate [the] commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.”6
While the Guidelines themselves do not limit the issue of physical restraint
at sentencing to robbery cases, this Note narrows its focus to the physical

1. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. 1(L) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
2. See United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he application note unhelpfully states that ‘physical restraint’ means ‘forcible restraint.’ Yet, as we have
said, restraint itself includes the use of force. Thus, the application note would appear to refer
to the forcible use of force, which redundancy does not advance matters much.”) (emphases
added).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2019). Also, note
that the Guidelines do not limit the issue of physical restraint at sentencing to robbery cases.
See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021). However, this
Note narrows its focus to the issue of physical restraint as it relates to robbery sentencing
under Chapter Two of the Guidelines. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
4. This increase is known as a “sentencing enhancement.” They are applicable “only if
the defendant has already committed some other underlying crime[,] . . . the prosecutor elects
to charge it[,] and . . . the sentencing enhancement has not been incorporated into the Guidelines calculation for the underlying crime.” Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment
Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 329 (2009). When they
are applied, they “often generate sentences far different from the otherwise applicable Guidelines sentences.” Id. at 330.
5. The base offense level is a general measurement of the severity of the crime. See U.
S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_Sentencing_
Guidelines.pdf. The United States Sentencing Commission assigns each federal criminal
offense a “base offense level:” the lowest is (1); the highest is (43). U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021). Understandably, crimes with greater
base offense levels are subjected to more serious punishment and lengthier periods of incarceration than crimes with lower base offense levels. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING: THE BASICS, 22–25 (2020).
6. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
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restraint enhancement used in robbery cases under Chapter Two of the
Guidelines.7
Like many issues of interpretation, the problem with this enhancement
relates to its scope and application.8 The question that arises most often is
whether the physical restraint enhancement applies if the defendant brandished a weapon during the commission of a robbery, aimed it towards a
victim, and commanded him to remain immobile—“Don’t move,” “Get on
the floor,” “Stay put”—but never made actual physical contact with a person
either through force or confinement. In the last quarter-century, all but one
of the federal circuits have answered this question.9 Among these courts
there is considerable disagreement about the proper scope and application of
the physical restraint enhancement.10 Despite the longevity of this circuit
split, the search for the proper interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B)
has attracted the attention of commentators only recently. 11
Within this small group, there is near-unanimous support for a more
limited definition—one that preserves the rule’s narrow focus and prevents
it from transforming into a universal sentencing enhancement applicable in
most robberies tried in federal court.12 This Note joins those commentators
who have argued in favor of a strict interpretation of U.S.S.G. §
2B3.1(b)(4)(B). However, it proposes an alternative course of resolution.13
Currently, the leading paper on this issue calls for the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) to revise the physical restraint enhancement in order to make its application consistent and to eliminate the circuit
split.14 This is a reasonable solution. After all, the Commission not only has
the authority, but the duty, to “periodically . . . review and revise” the
Guidelines in order to ensure their consistent application.15 Furthermore, in
Braxton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended the

7. Id. § 3A1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021) (felonies); Id. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021) (robberies).
8. See infra Section II.
9. See infra Section III.
10. See infra Section II.
11. See, e.g., Julia Knitter, Comment, “Don’t Move”: Redefining “Physical Restraint”
in Light of A United States Circuit Court Divide, 44 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205, 215–16 (2020);
Devin Thomas Slaugenhaupt, Note, Resolving Division Among The U.S. Courts Of Appeals:
What Constitutes A Physical Restraint?, 82 U. PITT. L. REV. 489, 497 (2020); Madeline C.
VerHey, Comment, Restrain Your Enthusiasm: United States v. Taylor and Robbery Enhancement for Restraint of a Victim, 62 B.C. L. REV., 226, 233–35 (2021).
12. See United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he defendants
did not do anything with their firearms that goes beyond what would normally occur during
an armed robbery.”).
13. See infra Section III.
14. Knitter, supra note 11, at 208.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
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Commission to be principally responsible for resolving circuit conflict
through its amendment process.16
However, the conflict has festered for nearly three decades17 because
the Commission has refused to amend its robbery guideline.18 The Commission’s failure to amend the physical restraint enhancement has led to unnecessarily punitive sentences, unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the inconsistent application of federal law.19 Accordingly, this Note argues that
the conflicting interpretations of the physical restraint enhancement provide
the Supreme Court with the appropriate vehicle to reconsider its hands-off
approach articulated in Braxton v. United States.20 Specifically, this Note
argues that the Court should abandon the passive role it designated for itself
and should interpret the sentencing enhancement narrowly in order to provide a uniform definition for the hopelessly divided federal circuits.21
Because this argument is best understood with some context of the evolution of federal sentencing law, this Note unfolds as follows: Section II
highlights the development of federal sentencing law, spanning from the
pre-Guidelines era until today.22 Then, Section III examines the competing
interpretations of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and the surrounding circuit
conflict.23 Last, Section IV argues that the Supreme Court should take a
more active role in the shaping of federal sentencing policy by interpreting
the specific provisions of the Guidelines.24 In doing so, the Court should
interpret U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and provide a definition that resolves
the circuit conflict in favor of a strict interpretation that preserves the physical restraint enhancement’s narrow purpose.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Sentencing Without Guardrails: The Era of Indeterminate Sentencing

From the 1930s until the 1980s, federal sentencing was “indeterminate.”25 Judges sentenced convicted defendants, usually to a term of years in
16. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348–49 (1991).
17. See infra Section II.
18. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
19. See infra Section III.
20. See infra Section IV; Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348–49.
21. See infra Section III.
22. See infra Section II.
23. See infra Section III.
24. See infra Section IV.
25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–64 (1989) (discussing the history of
pre-guidelines sentencing); U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 2; Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 141–43 (2013) (discussing the history
of indeterminate sentencing from 1930-1970).
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prison, and then the United States Parole Commission determined how
much of the sentence the defendant actually served.26 The Parole Commission had the authority to release an inmate before he or she served the full
duration of the sentence upon a finding of rehabilitation.27 The judiciary’s
and the Parole Commission’s shared authority made sentencing truly “indeterminate” because it was difficult to predict how long the convicted defendant would remain incarcerated.28 As then Chief-Judge Stephen Breyer
explained, “a judge might sentence an offender to twelve years, but the Parole Commission could release him after four.”29 In practice, this was common, as most inmates served only a fraction of the sentence the court imposed.30
During this era, federal sentencing was not only indeterminate but also
largely dependent upon the discretion of individual judges.31 Judges wielded
essentially unbridled discretion to impose any sentence below the given
criminal statute’s maximum punishment.32 Moreover, there were no restrictions on the type of information judges could consider at sentencing,33
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 4163 (prisoner discharged at expiration of term of sentence less
good conduct credits), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. II §218(a)(4),
98 Stat. 2027; Id.§ 4164 (prisoner released on good conduct considered on parole until expiration of sentence term), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. II
§218(a)(4), 98 Stat. 2027; Id. § 4205 (eligible for parole after serving one-third of court imposed sentence), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. II §218(a)(4), 98
Stat. 2027.
27. See id. § 4163 (prisoner discharged at expiration of term of sentence less good conduct credits), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. II §218(a)(4), 98 Stat.
2027; Id.§ 4164 (prisoner released on good conduct considered on parole until expiration of
sentence term), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. II §218(a)(4), 98 Stat.
2027; Id. § 4205 (eligible for parole after serving one-third of court imposed sentence), repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, tit. II, ch. II §218(a)(4), 98 Stat. 2027.
28. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990).
29. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988).
30. Nagel, supra note 28, at 884 (“[S]entences pronounced by the court were, with rare
exception, never served: twelve years meant four, eighteen meant six, thirty meant ten.”).
31. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, A Century of Criminal Justice: Crimes and Punishments: A
Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, Or Just Right, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 696 (2010) (“A trial judge’s authority to sentence was virtually unquestioned.”).
32. Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 169–70 (1995) (“Subject only to statutory maximums and the
occasional minimums, judges had the authority to sentence convicted defendants . . . .”); Kate
Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993) (“The great majority of federal criminal statutes have stated only a maximum term of years . . . .”).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
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and “[t]hey were not required to explain their reasons for the sentence imposed.”34 Additionally, the sentence was, for all practical purposes, unreviewable on appeal.35 Without appellate review, the federal system never
developed a substantive common law of sentencing, unlike many other
western democracies.36 Consequently, unburdened with legislative oversight
or judicial review, the sentencing judge was entrenched in a position of significant authority, left alone to punish according to his or her own conceptions of justice and fairness.37
The immense discretion afforded to district court judges was purportedly justified by the rehabilitative penal theory.38 At the time, crime was
widely understood to be a moral disease39 that could be “treated” by incarceration.40 As such, “the judge’s role was essentially therapeutic, much like
a physician.”41 The judge was to “individualize” the punishment according
to the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the offender, much like
a medical doctor prescribes treatment according to the nature of the symp-

United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”).
34. UNITED STATES SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM iv (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING].
35. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (citing United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 447 (1972); see, e.g., United States v. Brenneman, 918 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir.
1990) (“If the sentence imposed is within the applicable statutory limits, the sentence is generally not subject to review on appeal.”); Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, “Consulting” the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1502 (2006) (“So long
as the sentence was below the statutory maximum allowed by Congress, it was treated with
‘virtually unconditional deference on appeal.’”).
36. Gertner, supra note 31, at 695–96.
37. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5
(1973).
38. E.g., Stith & Koh, supra note 32, at 227 (“The motivating rationale for . . . indeterminacy . . . was the rehabilitation of prisoners.”).
39. Nagel, supra note 28, at 893 (“[Crime is] a moral disease, of which punishment is
the remedy. . . . The supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals and not
the infliction of vindictive suffering.” (quoting AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION,
TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PRISONS AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE
(1870))); Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 370 (2010)
(“[C]riminal practice was dominated by a model of punishment that emphasized individualized sentences, rehabilitation of offenders, and judicial and administrative discretion.”).
40. Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (2005).
41. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV.
569, 571 (2005) [hereinafter When Everyone Behaves Badly].
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toms and the characteristics of the patient.42 Accordingly, to interfere with a
judge’s discretion at sentencing was no less unthinkable “than to limit the
information available to a medical doctor in determining a diagnosis.”43
Naturally, in a system dependent upon the discretion of individual
judges, there was little uniformity in punishment.44 Defendants convicted of
similar crimes with similar criminal backgrounds seldom received equal, or
even proportional, punishments.45 At the time, “[r]esearch demonstrated that
philosophical differences among judges affected the sentences they imposed”; that some judges were too severe, others too lenient; and that judges
typically varied in their approaches to particular criminal offenses.46 By the
1970s, however, there was considerable enthusiasm on both the political left
and right to reform the indeterminate system by reigning in judicial discretion.47 By the mid-1980s, the indeterminate regime was replaced with a
strict, detailed, mandatory sentencing guideline system that survived until
2005.

42. PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENCING: THE PROMISE AND THE REALITY OF
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 11 (State Univ. N.Y. Press 1991) (noting that “[a] medical analogue
was frequently invoked”); e.g., Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (“It is necessary to individualize each case, to give that careful, humane, and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each offender which would be possible only in the exercise
of a broad discretion.”).
43. Gertner, supra note 31, at 695; see also Burns, 287 U.S. at 220.
44. William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to §
3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 635–38 (2008) (“[U]nlimited
discretion . . . resulted, over time, in increasingly observed disparities and inconsistencies in
sentences.”). However, many scholars note that Congress overestimated the problem of sentencing discrepancies. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 104–42 (Univ. Chi. Press 1998) (noting
that inter-judge disparity was not as rampant or as “shameful” as congress believed when it
enacted the SRA.); Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to be Doing:
Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 300 (2013) (“The reformers did
not actually know very much about inter-judge disparity. They argued that such disparity was
so great as to be ‘shameful,’ but the evidence did not support this claim. At most, there were
modest disparities.”).
45. See generally FRANKEL, supra note 37, at 5.
46. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 34, at x.
47. See generally Stith & Koh, supra note 32, at 227–28; see also James M. Anderson et
al., Measuring Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity Before and After the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 272 (1999) (“Liberals expressed particular concern that
permitting the exercise of discretion compromised the ideal of equal treatment under the law,
while conservatives were concerned as well with perceived undue leniency in sentencing.”).
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The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: The Sentencing Commission, and
Mandatory Guidelines

After a decade of trying,48 Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 (SRA).49 The SRA had far-reaching effects.50 Through it, Congress
aimed to eradicate the sentencing disparities that plagued the indeterminate
regime,51 as well as to introduce “consistency, coherence, and accountability
to a federal sentencing process that was deficient in [those] respects.”52 To
achieve those goals, Congress tipped federal sentencing practice on its head
in a dramatic way—a 180-degree reversal of the status quo—by overhauling
the indeterminate regime and replacing it with a strict, mandatory guideline
system.53
The SRA instituted three key reforms. First, retribution replaced rehabilitation as the primary purpose of criminal sentencing.54 To give the philosophical shift practical effect, Congress abolished the Parole Commission—
no longer would an inmate’s sentence be reduced upon a finding of rehabili48. See Stith & Koh, supra note 32, for a thorough discussion on the legislative history
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
49. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18
U.S.C §§ 3551 et seq; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98).
50. Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 679–80
(1996) (“[T]he Guidelines system is probably the most significant development in ‘judging’
in the federal judicial system since the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; no one can pretend to understand the work of federal judges today without some appreciation of the Guidelines system and what it has done to the courts and what it has done to the
work of judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and others who work in the federal judicial
system.”).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (“The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to . . . avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . . .”); see also U. S. SENT’G
COMM’N, supra note 5, at 2–3; Breyer, supra note 29, at 4 (explaining the purposes of the
Sentencing Reform Act).
52. Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1997). This has also been referred to as “honesty in sentencing.” See Breyer, supra note 29, at 4.
53. See Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal,
36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 84–88 (1988) (discussing the dramatic changes implemented by the
SRA).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (“The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the
inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”) (emphases added); see also U.S.C. §
944(t) (“The Commission . . . shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and
compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of
specific examples. Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.”).
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tation.55 Second, Congress authorized appellate review of sentences for the
first time in American history.56 Third, and most importantly, Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent administrative agency housed in the judicial branch,57 to promulgate uniform rules
of sentencing in the form of guidelines, to “periodically . . . review and revise” the guidelines, and to collect data on their implementation.58
With the admission of a new institutional player into the criminal justice system, Congress attempted to guarantee to the public that the Commission was independent and comprised of sentencing experts.59 Accordingly, it
attempted to politically isolate the Commission by requiring its members to
undergo Senate confirmation, by requiring that no more than four of the
seven members be of the same political party, and by requiring at least three
members to be federal judges.60
But Congress’s vision of a politically independent Commission comprised of neutral sentencing experts was never realized.61 Rather, the Commission was political from its inception.62 Moreover, not one of its original
members had experience in the day-to-day sentencing of convicted defendants.63 As the Commission drafted the first edition of the Guidelines, it “dis-

55. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 10 (2018).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3742, invalidated in part by Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 481
(2011); see also United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949–50 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he very
theory of the Guidelines system is that when courts, drawing upon experience and informed
judgment in such cases, decide to depart, they will explain their departures. The courts of
appeals, and the Sentencing Commission, will examine, and learn from, those reasons. And,
the resulting knowledge will help the Commission to change, to refine, and to improve, the
Guidelines themselves.”).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
58. Id. § 994(o).
59. See id. § 991(a); see also Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2012) (“Congress lacked the expertise and political neutrality required
for this task, and chose instead to delegate the job to a sentencing commission.”).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
61. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 59, at 1660–64.
62. See id. at 1640; see also Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (2005)
(“[T]he architects of the [SRA] miscalculated and created a sentencing structure almost perfectly designed for capture and manipulation by the political branches.”); Rachel E. Barkow,
Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 765 (2005) (“[T]he Sentencing Commission
was a highly politicized agency from the outset. Then-Judge Stephen Breyer, one of the initial members of the Commission, wrote that the Commission reached certain compromises in
its initial set of guidelines because ‘the Commission was appointed by politically responsible
officials and is therefore, at least to some degree, a “political” body.’”) (quoting Breyer,
supra note 29, at 8).
63. Gertner, supra note 31, at 700; see Stith & Koh, supra note 32, at 282–83 (“Many of
these critics, especially those who were in the vanguard of the sentencing guidelines movement, have directed their criticisms not at the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 but at the
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played a pro-prosecution bias, and its members viewed . . . the most lawand-order members of Congress as their primary political constituency.”64
Unsurprisingly, by the time the draft was complete, the Commission had
simply taken existing punishment ranges and severely increased them—
sometimes beyond even the statutory maximums established by Congress.65
The first Commission often frustrated the purposes of the SRA by consistently defying Congress’s intent. For example, Congress intended to allow probation for first-time offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes (often
drug charges), yet the Commission ignored the legislature and proceeded to
impose imprisonment in the vast majority of cases.66 Additionally, at the
time, it was unclear whether the first edition of the Guidelines would carry
the full force of law—that is, whether they would be mandatory or advisory.67 Yet, in lockstep with the Reagan administration,68 the Commission proceeded on the assumption that the Guidelines were mandatory and chose to
restrict judicial discretion as forcefully as possible.69
Commission—as if to say that the problem is not the idea of sentencing guidelines, but the
people who implemented the idea.”).
64. Adelman, supra note 44, at 302; see also Barkow, supra note 62, at 763 (discussing
the overrepresentation of law enforcement interests among the original commissioners); Stith
& Koh, supra note 32, at 285 (“[T]o the extent that ideological and political objectives did
significantly affect outcomes in both Congress and the Sentencing Commission in the 1980’s,
it is not surprising that ‘law-and-order’ concerns dominated.”).
65. Adelman, supra note 44, at 302; Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 59, at 1648–49
(noting that the Commission chose to use mandatory minimum sentences as the base levels
for the Guidelines, in effect requiring sentences even above the levels that Congress had set);
When Everyone Behaves Badly, supra note 41, at 575 (“The Commission simply calculated
the average length of sentences in the United States—and then increased them.”); Paul Hofer, After Ten Years of Advisory Guidelines, and Thirty Years of Mandatory Minimums, Federal Sentencing Still Needs Reform, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2016) (“The average prison
time served by federal defendants more than doubled after the Guidelines became effective. .
. . The federal prison population grew 400%.”).
66. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 59, at 1662.
67. See Stith & Koh, supra note 32, at 244 (“Critics of the idea of an administrative
sentencing commission expressed the fear that its sentencing guidelines might unduly limit
the discretion of the sentencing court, so that the commission’s ‘guideline’ sentences ‘might
in effect become mandatory sentences.’ As if to respond to this concern, the measure approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in late 1977 deliberately granted the sentencing
judge significant discretion to depart from the relevant guideline sentence for the case at
hand—as long as the sentence imposed was not ‘clearly unreasonable’ and the sentencing
judge explained in writing the reasons for departure from the guideline sentence.”); Gertner,
supra note 31, at 698–99.
68. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 59, at 1662.
69. Catharine M. Goodwin, Background of the AO Memorandum Opinion on the 25%
Rule, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 109, 109 (1995); see Stith & Cabranes, supra note 52, at 1254; see
also Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 59, at 1641 (“The Commission acted forcefully to
prevent judicial departures and judicial scrutiny of the guidelines even before, and repeatedly
after, the guidelines went into effect.”).
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As mentioned above, the SRA’s goal was to eliminate unwarranted
sentencing disparities.70 It intended to do so by structuring judicial decisionmaking with uniform factors and considerations.71 Yet, the Commission
went far beyond structured guidance. It essentially strangled judicial discretion, abandoning the individualization of criminal sentences with predetermined judgments ready to be applied equally in classes of similar cases.72
This paradigm shift ultimately produced a federal criminal system that was
more punitive than ever before.73 And by 1989, district court judges could
do nothing about the severity of the Guidelines, because in Mistretta v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines were mandatory
and binding on district courts.74 As a result, over the span of just a few years,
federal judges lost the discretion they once enjoyed as they watched sentencing transition from a purely judicial craft into a mathematical, bureaucratic
procedure.75
Under the Guidelines, judges had little opportunity to consider the culpability of the convicted defendant before them.76 In many instances, the
Commission made that determination in advance.77 In this system, the
judge’s principal role is to calculate the defendant’s sentence by using a
predetermined equation.78 This equation has three components.79 First, the
court determines the “base offense level” for the crime of which the defendant was convicted.80 The base offense level is a score that represents the
severity of the crime.81 More serious crimes have higher base offense levels,
and in turn, higher base offense levels result in harsher sentences.82 Second,
the court considers the convicted defendant’s “actual conduct,” that is, what

70. U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 2–3.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Gertner, supra note 31, at 701.
74. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–67 (1989).
75. See Gertner, supra note 31, at 695–99; Stith & Cabranes, supra note 52, at 1254 (“In
place of moral judgment, the Guidelines have substituted bureaucratic penalization. The
judge on the elevated bench remains a visible symbol of society’s moral authority, but the
substance and meaning of this ancient staging is gone in most cases.”).
76. Stith & Cabranes, supra note 52, at 1254 (“The Guidelines themselves determine not
only which factors are relevant (and irrelevant) to criminal punishment, but also, in most
circumstances, the precise quantitative relevance of each factor.”).
77. See id. at 1254–56.
78. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021) (sentencing calculation instructions).
79. See id.
80. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2).
81. See Bowman, supra note 50, at 698.
82. See id.
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the offender really did.83 At this point, the court determines whether any
sentencing enhancements or deviations apply in adjusting the base offense
level.84 Third, the judge determines the defendant’s “criminal history
score,”85 which is a calculation designed to predict the convicted defendant’s
propensity to break the law.86 Like the base offense level, the higher the
criminal history score, the harsher the sentence.87 Once this formula is completed, the court references the calculations with the Guidelines’ Sentencing
Table to determine the sentencing range.88

89

83. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2, cmt. 3(B) (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
84. See Bowman, supra note 50, at 699; see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(3)–(5) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
85. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(6)–(7) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021).
86. Bowman, supra note 50, at 695. (“The criminal history calculation is a rough effort
to determine the defendant’s disposition to criminality, as reflected in his prior contacts with
the criminal law.”).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 700.
89. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021) [hereinafter Sentencing Table]. The “base offense level” is represented in the Y-axis. The “criminal history score” is represented in the X-axis. See supra text accompanying notes 79–88.
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If the district court misapplies the Guidelines, the sentence can be vacated on appeal.90 Here, reversal may go one of two ways. The defendant
can appeal when the sentence imposed exceeded the applicable Guideline
range or when a specific Guideline provision was incorrectly applied in his
or her case.91 Similarly, the Government can appeal when the sentence falls
below the applicable Guideline range.92 When the sentence is appealed, the
appellate court often must interpret a specific Guideline provision. Here, the
court interprets the language of the Guideline just as it does any other federal law.93
Under the mandatory guidelines regime, appeals happened regularly.
This is partly because the Guidelines are notoriously complicated.94 Many of
its provisions are vague, confusing, or “exceedingly technical.”95 Naturally,
with such a complicated body of law, appellate courts often disagree about
the meaning and scope of a specific provision.96 Consequently, with the introduction of appellate review to the sentencing regime, inter-circuit conflict
is largely inevitable.97
When conflicting interpretations of the Guidelines are left unresolved,
the primary purpose of the SRA—eliminating unwarranted sentencing dis90. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)–(b).
91. Id. § 3742(a); see also Berry III, supra note 44, at 640–41 (discussing the appellate
review process).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017) (defining the
scope of the U.S. Sentencing Commissions Guidelines Manual § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), the “physical restraint” sentencing enhancement).
94. See Douglas A. Berman, The Sentencing Commission as Guidelines Supreme Court:
Responding to Circuit Conflicts, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 142, 142 (1994).
95. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 52, at 1266–69 (discussing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2: “The
Guidelines provide that the defendant’s [base] offense level should be reduced by two points
if [he or she] was only a ‘minor’ participant in the offense, but by four points if [he or she]
was a ‘minimal’ participant.”); see also United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th
Cir. 1997) (discussing Guidelines § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B): “Anything that happens in the concrete
world can be said to be physical. Moreover, the application note unhelpfully states that ‘physical restraint’ means ‘forcible restraint.’ Yet, as we have said, restraint itself includes the use
of force. Thus, the application note would appear to refer to the forcible use of force, which
redundancy does not advance matters much.” (emphasis added)).
96. Berman, supra note 94, at 142 (“Given the scope and complexity of the sentencing
guidelines, it is inevitable, no matter how carefully the Commission chooses words . . ., that
courts will differ sometimes in their reading of guideline provisions and in their application
of those provisions to the facts of varying cases.” (quoting William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R.
Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing
Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 74–75 (1993)).
97. See Elliot Edwards, Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities in Federal Sentencing
Under the Post-Booker Guidelines, 92 IND. L.J. 817, 824–26 (2017).
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parities—is undermined because, when the sentencing rules vary from circuit to circuit, defendants are at a heightened risk of receiving disproportionate punishments for the same or similar crimes.98 The question thus becomes, Which institution is responsible for resolving circuit conflicts?99 In
theory, there are two institutions capable of resolving conflicting interpretations of specific Guidelines provisions: (1) the Commission, which can resolve the conflict by revising a given provision through the amendment process;100 and (2) the United States Supreme Court, upon a petition for a writ
of certiorari.101
In practice, however, the burden of eliminating circuit splits rests entirely upon the Commission.102 In Braxton v. United States, the Supreme
Court declared its reluctance to resolve conflicting interpretations of specific
Guidelines provisions, because Congress entrusted the Commission to ensure consistent application of the law it creates through its amendment process.103 The Court reasoned that the Commission is principally responsible
for resolving circuit splits because 28 U.S.C. § 944(o) commands the Commission to “periodically review and revise” the Guidelines.104 Therefore,
even though a “principal purpose” of the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction is to resolve conflicts concerning the interpretation of federal law,105
the Court in Braxton allowed the Commission to perform “essentially the
same role” with respect to the interpretation of other federal laws through its
amendment process.106 The result of the Court’s decision has been truly
unique in American administrative law, as the Commission now operates as
its own “Guidelines Supreme Court.” According to Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Alito, no other federal agency has “ever performed a role anything
like it.”107

98. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“[I]ntracircuit sentencing disparities . . . defeat the fundamental
purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines: ‘reasonable uniformity in sentencing’. . . .”).
99. Compare Knitter, supra note 11, at 214–19 (calling for the Commission to redefine
the physical restraint sentencing enhancement), with Slaugenhaupt, supra note 11, at 491
(calling for the Supreme Court to define “physical restraint” in order to resolve the circuit
split.).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)–(p).
101. See Slaugenhaupt, supra note 11, at 491.
102. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1991).
103. Id. at 348.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 347–48.
106. Samuel Alito, Reviewing the Sentencing Commission’s 1991 Annual Report, 5 FED.
SENT’G REP. 166, 168 (1992).
107. Id.
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United States v. Booker: The “Effectively Advisory” Guidelines

The Guidelines were binding until 2005, when the Supreme Court excised the two provisions of the SRA that made them mandatory. 108 In United
States v. Booker, the Court held that mandatory Guidelines violate the Sixth
Amendment because they require judges to find facts preordained by the
Commission that increase sentences beyond the range required by the jury
or a guilty plea.109 To replace the mandatory Guidelines, the Court made the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)110 the ultimate law of sentencing and established a “reasonableness” standard of review for sentencing determinations
on appeal.111 However, the Supreme Court did not eliminate the Guidelines
from federal sentencing procedure. Instead, it reduced their status to effectively advisory.112
This does not mean that the Guidelines are toothless. Since Booker, the
Supreme Court has emphasized that the Guidelines must be the “starting
point” and “initial benchmark” at sentencing.113 In other words, the sentencing court must first calculate the sentencing range by consulting the Guidelines before it decides whether to depart from the Guidelines range, but the
sentencing judge now has a greater opportunity to depart from the recommended range.114 However, the reform has only recently begun to make a
difference in sentencing practice because in the years following Booker,
many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines as “virtually mandatory.”115 The continued reliance on the Guidelines is likely because many fed108. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005) (holding that 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b)(1), the provision that had confined departures to specified, limited circumstances,
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), the standard of review under which courts of appeals had enforced
those limitations, were unconstitutional).
109. Id. at 243–44; see also Gertner, supra note 31, at 705.
110. The factors considered include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; . . . (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentenc[ing] disparities . .
. ; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1)–(3), (6), (7).
111. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 59, at 1632.
112. Id. at 1633.
113. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 (2007); see also Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S 85, 91 (2007).
114. U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 17–18.
115. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 59, at 1633. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 360–62 (2007) (Stephens, J., concurring).
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eral judges who had grown accustomed to the Guidelines are now understandably hesitant to return to indeterminate sentencing.116 And, as the “initial benchmark” and “starting point” of all federal sentences, the Guidelines
continue to substantially shape the federal sentencing system.117
III.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE “PHYSICAL RESTRAINT” SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENT

The physical restraint enhancement is located in Chapter Two of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.118 Under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), the
government may enhance the convicted defendant’s base offense level by
two points when the defendant “physically restrained” “any person . . . to
facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.”119 The definition
of “physically restrained” is located in Chapter One of the Guidelines.120
Under U.S.S.G. § 1.B1, “physically restrained” is the “forcible restraint of
the victim such as being tied, bound, or locked up.”121 The base offense level
for the crime of robbery is twenty.122 Depending on the defendant’s criminal
history score, the sentencing range might fall anywhere between thirty-three
and eighty-seven months.123 When the physical restraint enhancement applies, it raises the base offense level from twenty to twenty-two.124 This twolevel adjustment increases the defendant’s sentencing range, depending on
his or her criminal history, from anywhere between forty-one and 105
months.125
116. Hofer, supra note 65, at 677 (“Another reason why so many defendants continue to
be sentenced within the Guidelines might be called fear of discretion. If the fairness and
effectiveness of the Guidelines recommendations are doubted, judges can feel at a loss for
objective standards and principles to help them determine the right sentence. There is concern
that unguided discretion will lead to disparity.”); Gertner, supra note 31, at 706 (“Even after
the Supreme Court declared mandatory application of the Guidelines to be unconstitutional,
many judges continued to believe in the ideology of the Guidelines and urged continued
deference. Many judges seemed to be uncomfortable exercising the discretion they now had.
Many continued to use the numbers in the Guideline framework as a point of reference, illustrating the phenomenon known to cognitive researchers as anchoring.”).
117. See U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 42 n. 31 (“75.0% of all sentences were
within the guidelines system, including 51.4% that fell within the applicable guideline
range.”).
118. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2021) (the Robbery Guideline).
119. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
120. Id. § 1B1.
121. Id..
122. Id. § 2B3.1(a).
123. See Sentencing Table, supra note 89.
124. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B3.1(a), (b)(4)(B) (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021).
125. See Sentencing Table, supra note 89.
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In the last twenty-five years, a deep split of authority has developed regarding the application of the physical restraint enhancement.126 Particularly,
the circuits are divided as to whether the enhancement applies when the defendant verbally commands a bystander to remain immobile (usually at
gunpoint) but does not actually “tie, bind, or lock away” the person to facilitate the commission of the offense.127 The Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits strictly construe the enhancement; they require
something more than brandishing a weapon and ordering the victim to “get
down.”128 Conversely, the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits are more flexible in their interpretation; they allow it to be applied
when the defendant orders the victim to remain immobile at gunpoint.129 In
the following paragraphs, this Section details the competing interpretations
of the physical restraint sentencing enhancement—U.S.S.G. §
2B3.1(b)(4)(B).
A.

The Strict Interpretation

The Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have
adopted a stricter, more literal construction of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) in
comparison to their sister circuits. While there is some nuance that distinguishes their individual approaches, they all ground their analyses in the
plain language of the Guidelines’ definition of “physically restrained.”130
126. See infra Sections III.A–B.
127. Compare United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[A] defendant physically restrains his victims if he ‘creates circumstances allowing the persons no alternative but compliance.’” (quoting United States v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam))) with United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Congress meant for something more than briefly pointing a gun at a victim and commanding her
once to get down to constitute physical restraint, given that nearly all armed bank robberies
will presumably involve such acts.”).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2019).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008).
130. United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 1999) (“‘[P]hysical’ is an adjective which modifies (and hence limits) the noun ‘restraint.’ . . . ‘[R]estraint’ is a condition
capable of being brought about by a number of forces—physical, mental, moral, singly or in
combination . . . . Clearly the Sentencing Commission intended a more precise concept . . .
[by including the word physical].”); United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 57 (3rd. Cir. 2020)
(“We discern a common thread in these cases regarding the meaning of ‘physical’ in the
definition of physical restraint: the need for the restraint to be something more than a psychological restraint.”); United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have
little doubt that at least one of the employees felt restrained when the barrel of a gun touched
the back of his neck. Still, this employee and his coworkers were not subjected to the type of
physical restraint that victims experience when they are tied, bound, or locked up.”); United
States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Words should mean something, and . .
. the fact that the Guidelines call for physical restraint tells us that not all restraints warrant
the two-level enhancement.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114,
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For example, in United States v. Anglin, a Second Circuit case, the defendant had been convicted of robbing a bank.131 When he entered the bank, he
aimed his weapon at two bank tellers and instructed them to get on the
floor.132 He did not tie, bind, or lock up the victims; yet, upon conviction, the
district court had adjusted his base offense level by two points by applying
the physical restraint enhancement.133
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the sentence, noting that the district court had essentially disregarded the plain meaning of the word in question: “physical.”134 The unanimous court reasoned that “‘physical’ is an adjective which modifies (and hence limits) the noun ‘restraint.’”135 Therefore,
in the absence of any actual physical contact or restraint, the enhancement
was inapplicable because the Commission “intended a more precise concept” when it limited the definition to an illustrative list of actions involving
contact.136 The court explained that while the bank tellers likely felt restrained, the enhancement was inapplicable because the defendant’s conduct
was not of the same nature as the examples enumerated in the Guidelines’
definition.137 As a result, the court held that brandishing a weapon and ordering the victim to remain immobile, “without more,” cannot trigger U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).138
Many of these strict-interpretation circuits have noted that the Guidelines’ examples are not exhaustive but rather illustrative of the type of conduct punishable under the physical restraint enhancement.139 In practice,
however, these circuits have been reluctant to expand their application beyond the Guidelines’ enumerated examples.140 For example, in United States
v. Harris, the D.C. Circuit found that confining someone for seven days was
sufficient for physical restraint under the guidelines.141 Building upon this
holding, in United States v. Drew the D.C. Circuit held that the two-level
1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001) United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
phrase ‘being tied, bound, or locked up’ indicates that physical restraint requires the defendant either to restrain the victim through bodily contact or to confine the victim in some
way.”).
131. 169 F.3d at 156.
132. Id. at 157.
133. Id. at 156–57.
134. Id. at 164–65.
135. Id. at 164.
136. Id.
137. Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164–65.
138. Id. at 164.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 55 (3rd Cir. 2020) (“[W]e, along with
many of our sister circuits, have held that the three examples provided in the definition of
physically restrained are not an exhaustive list, but rather only examples of the types of conduct that fall within the meaning of the term.”).
140. See United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 79–81 (2d Cir. 2020).
141. United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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upward adjustment does not apply unless the defendant either (1) “restrain[s] the victim through bodily contact or [(2)] . . . confine[s] the victim
in some way.”142 In Drew, the D.C. Circuit refused to uphold Wilbert
Drew’s enhanced sentence after he broke into his estranged wife’s house,
located her, aimed a shotgun at her, and ordered her to move from one room
of the home into another.143 The court reasoned that this conduct was materially different from the Guidelines’ examples because the victim was not
subjected to the type of physical restraint enumerated in the Guidelines’
definition; thus, the district court had incorrectly adjusted Drew’s sentence
as a matter of law.144
These circuits justify their textual analyses by considering the purpose
of sentencing enhancements, generally145—that is, to punish specific conduct that aggravates the underlying criminal offense.146 Accordingly, the
strict approach adopted by these circuits reflects a collective effort to preserve the enhancement’s limited purpose.147 This hesitancy is rooted not
only in the justifications supporting certain punishments but in fear of creating an overly punitive analysis for its application.148 In other words, these
circuits are unwilling to shape the application of the enhancement in a way
that creates additional punishment for conduct that actually constitutes the
underlying criminal offense itself.149 To illustrate, one expects an armed
robber to brandish a weapon and then say, “Don’t move!” 150 As the Anglin
Court pointed out, it would be rather strange for a robber to withdraw a
weapon and then say, “[T]his is a holdup, but feel free to move about . . .
.”151 Therefore, courts adopting a narrow interpretation hesitate to apply the
enhancement in these instances because to hold otherwise would punish
conduct that occurs in virtually every armed robbery, which would have the
142. 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Harris, 959 F.2d at 265)). Note that this
case was not a robbery case, but an attempted murder case. Id. at 875–77. Accordingly, the
enhancement that was applied was U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3, not § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Id. at 876. However, the definition discussed here is controlling for each provision.
143. Id. at 875, 880.
144. Id. at 880 (“[The victim] was ‘not subject to physical restraint, as we interpret the
Guideline’s use of that phrase.’” (quoting United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164–65 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
145. See United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999).
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001)
148. See United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 204 (2d. Cir. 2018).
149. Id. (“Adding the enhancement in this case would simply add punishment to conduct
that is typical of most store robberies.”); United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319, 321 (2d. Cir.
1993) (“Application of the enhancement for physical restraint is proper as long as restraint is
not an element of the primary offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and it
therefore does not result in double counting offense conduct toward sentencing.”).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017)
151. Anglin, 169 F.3d at 165.
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effect of automatically raising the base offense level from twenty to twentytwo.152
In tethering the enhancement’s application to the Guidelines’ definition
and examples, these circuits distinguish binding, tying, and locking up from
the understandably frightening experience of being told to “get down” at
gunpoint.153 They do so for three reasons: First, while the Guidelines’ examples effectively secure the victim’s immobilization, a verbal order to “get
down” might have no effect on the “bold []or foolhardy.”154 For example, in
United States v. Wallace, an armed robber entered a gun store, aimed his
weapon at the store clerk, and said, “Don’t move.” 155 Despite the threatening
order, the clerk instinctively bolted and attempted to run out the door.156
Thus, the strict-interpretation circuits point out that the Guidelines’ examples are dependent upon the defendant’s action and not the victim’s reaction.157 As the Seventh Circuit explained in Herman v. United States:
[T]he victim’s reaction does not determine whether there is or is not
physical restraint. If the defendant waives a gun around and barks out a
command to stay still and the victim obeys, it makes no sense to say that
the recipient of the order was physically restrained. Whatever restraint
occurred came about from the way the victim decided to respond to the
order. She might obey; she might ignore it; or she might attempt to flee.
Her physical response to the defendant’s attempt to coerce, however, is
not something that logically belongs within the scope of the physicalrestraint guideline.158

Second, these circuits reason that if the Commission intended to punish
every conceivable form of restraint, it would not have qualified its application to those that are only physical.159 Because the Guidelines’ definition
illustrates what physical restraint means through the examples of binding,
152. Id.
153. Id. at 164–65 (“[T]he restraint must be ‘physical’; and while we do not doubt that
the City College Branch robber’s conduct caused the City College tellers to feel restraint,
they were not subjected to physical restraint, as we interpret the Guideline’s use of that
phrase.”); United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876–77 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A verbal order
issued by a person with a threatening appearance might terrify a bank teller . . . . And that
terrified person will often yield to the threats. Yet that does not make the restraint a physical
one.”).
154. Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164–65.
155. 461 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2006).
156. Id.
157. United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have little doubt
that at least one of the employees felt restrained when the barrel of a gun touched the back of
his neck. Still, this employee and his coworkers were not subjected to the type of physical
restraint that victims experience when they are tied, bound, or locked up.”).
158. Herman, 930 F.3d at 876.
159. See, e.g., id. at 876; Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164.
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tying, or locking up, these courts reason that the form of restraint that occurs
from an order to remain immobile is qualitatively different from what the
Commission intended to punish.160 Third, there are alternative, more appropriate sentencing enhancements and procedures available for prosecutors
and judges to punish defendants who engage in only threatening conduct.
For example, the judge may consider psychological coercion as a part of the
“nature and circumstances of the offense” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),161
and the prosecutor may seek an upward adjustment for a number of aggravating circumstances relating to using a weapon during the commission of
the robbery.162 Therefore, the existence of alternative sentencing mechanisms militates against the expansion of the physical restraint enhancement’s application to include conduct that is materially different from the
Guidelines’ examples.
Individually, these circuits incorporate the previously discussed principles and arguments into similar, although distinct, analyses of their own. For
example, the Second Circuit uses a three-factor test to determine when the
enhancement should be applied.163 First, the restraint must actually be physical.164 Second, the restraint must be something more than mere physical
contact.165 Third, the restraint must “facilitate” rather than “constitute” the
offense.166 Under the Second Circuit’s approach, brandishing a weapon and
verbally ordering the victim to remain immobile: (1) is not a physical, but a
psychological, restraint; (2) does not include physical contact; and (3) is
typical in most robberies; therefore, the physical restraint enhancement is
inapplicable in this instances.167
The Third Circuit adopted a similar, yet looser, balancing test of its
own. The test includes five factors.168 In determining whether the enhancement applies, courts in the Third Circuit balance the factors without giving
dispositive weight to any single one.169 However, this typically proves to be
a difficult undertaking, as a number of factors pull in opposite directions.
160. United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
161. Herman, 930 F.3d at 877.
162. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2021) (“[I]f a firearm was . . . used [but not discharged], increase by 6 levels[.]”); id §
2B3.1(b)(2)(C) (“[I]f a firearm was brandished or possessed, increase by 5 levels[.]”); id §
2B3.1(b)(2)(E) (“[I]f a dangerous weapon was brandished or possessed, increase by 3 levels[.]”).
163. See United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 78–80 (2d Cir. 2020).
164. Id. at 78.
165. Id. at 78–79.
166. Id. at 79.
167. See United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2018).
168. See United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 56 (3d Cir. 2020).
169. Id.
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Under this test, a court considers whether the convicted defendant: (1)
“use[d] . . . physical force”; (2) “exert[ed] control over the victim”; (3)
“provid[ed] the victim with no alternative but compliance”; (4) “focus[ed]
on the victim for some period of time”; and (5) placed the victim “in a confined space.”170
For its third factor, the Third Circuit borrows from the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits, which sit on the opposite side of this split of authority.171
As a result, although it has yet to happen, the physical restraint enhancement
might apply when the robber brandishes a weapon and orders the victim to
remain immobile so long as that order leaves the victim with no alternative
but to comply.172
The Ninth Circuit also follows a “sustained focus” standard.173 Under
this analysis, the enhancement may be triggered if the offender places a
“sustained focus” on the victim “that lasts long enough for the robber to
direct the victim into a room or order the victim to walk somewhere.”174
However, simply ordering the victim to “get down,” without more, fails to
amount to a “sustained focus.”175
The Fifth and D.C. Circuits, like the Second Circuit, forbid courts from
even considering whether the victim was physically restrained through psychological coercion.176 Unlike the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which
provide the possibility for application of the physical restraint enhancement
when the victim was left with “no alternative but compliance” or when the
offender placed a “sustained focus” on the victim, the Second, Fifth, and
D.C. Circuits do not consider the victims’ reactions to the threat.177
For example, in United States v. Garcia, the defendant entered a gun
store, aimed a handgun at an employee’s head, and ordered the other employee to “get down on the floor.”178 The Fifth Circuit held that the physical
restraint enhancement was inapplicable because “[s]uch conduct does not
differentiate . . . in any meaningful way from a typical armed robbery.”179
Like the Second Circuit in United States v. Taylor, and the D.C. Circuit in
United States v. Drew, the court arrived at its conclusion without consider170. Id.
171. Id. at 57–58.
172. See id. at 59.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998).
174. See United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d. 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001).
175. Id.
176. See United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also United
States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017).
177. Compare United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (requiring
“sustained focus” on a victim over a period of time) with United States v. Paul, 904 F.3d 200,
204 (2d Cir. 2018).
178. Garcia, 857 F.3d at 710.
179. Id. at 713.
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ing whether the victim felt like he had no meaningful alternative to comply
or that the offender’s sustained focus on him amounted to a physical restraint.180
In sum, these circuits vary in their approaches; however, they consistently hold that brandishing a weapon and ordering a robbery victim to remain immobile, without more, is insufficient to trigger the physical restraint
enhancement. These circuits routinely reach their conclusions by considering the plain language of the enhancement’s definition, the purpose of the
enhancement, and the consequences of expanding the analysis to include
conduct typical of most armed robberies.
B.

The Expansive Interpretation

The First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted an expansive interpretation of the physical restraint enhancement.
Like the circuits on the opposite side of the conflict, they understand the
Guidelines’ examples of physical restraint to be illustrative, as opposed to
an exclusive list of punishable conduct.181 However, the distinction is that
these circuits do not consider the examples to be a clue of the Commission’s
intended scope.182 As a result, whether the offender’s conduct was “nearly
identical”—or even similar—to the Guidelines’ examples is irrelevant.183
Rather, the dispositive factor is whether the offender deprived the victim of
physical movement somehow.184 Therefore, when the offender aims a weapon at a robbery victim and orders the person to remain immobile, the physical restraint enhancement applies.185
The expansive-interpretation circuits place less emphasis on the examples of binding, tying, and locking up, and more emphasis on a term the

180. Id.; see also Drew, 200 F.3d at 880; United States v. Taylor, 961 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.
2020).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he use of
the modifier ‘such as’ in the definition indicates that the illustrations of physical restraint ‘are
listed by way of example rather than limitation.’” (quoting United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d
319, 320–21 (2d Cir. 1993)); United States v. Ossai, 485 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Of
course, these enumerated examples of ‘physical restraint’ are merely illustrative, rather than
exhaustive.”); see also United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 55 (3d. Cir. 2020)
182. See, e.g., United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2011).
183. See, e.g., id. (“Because the intended scope of the . . . enhancement goes well beyond
the examples listed in [the Guidelines’ definition] . . . it makes little sense to tie the enhancement to conduct nearly identical to such examples either under the authority of Begay or the
Parker, Drew, and Anglin line of authority.”).
184. See United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 39 (1st Cir. 1998).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329–30 (10th Cir. 1997)
(“[P]hysical restraint occurs whenever a victim is specifically prevented at gunpoint from
moving, thereby facilitating the crime.”).
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Guidelines leave undefined: restraint.186 In the absence of a restraint definition from the Commission, the courts created their own.187 One commonly
used definition is articulated in United States v. Coleman.188 There, the Sixth
Circuit defined restraint as “the act of holding back from some activity or . .
. by means of force, an act that checks free activity or otherwise controls.” 189
With this definition in mind, coupled with the illustrative nature of the
Guidelines’ examples, these circuits often justify an expansive interpretation
of the physical restraint enhancement by reasoning that “[k]eeping someone
from doing something is inherent within the concept of restraint.”190 Therefore, because this conduct is a check on free activity, the physical restraint
enhancement applies.191
Unlike the strict interpretation, once any form of restraint is established, this approach is largely unconcerned with the means by which the
restraint occurred.192 For example, in United States v. Wallace, a man entered a gun store posing as a patron, approached the front counter, and requested to see certain ammunition clips for a handgun.193 When the clerk
turned to retrieve the clips, an accomplice entered the store and brandished a
semi-automatic rifle, and shouted, “Don’t move.”194 There was no physical
contact between the defendants and the victim.195 The defendants did not
confine the victim into an enclosed space in order to prevent her movement.196 Yet, the First Circuit held that there was “no doubt that the victims

186. See Ossai, 485 F.3d at 32.
187. The Guidelines define “physically restrained” as the “forcible restraint of the victim
such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” U.S. SENT’G COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL §
1B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021). However, the Guidelines fail to articulate what it means
to be restrained—whether that restraint is physical, psychological, or otherwise. See id.; see,
e.g., United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164–65 (2d Cir. 1999).
188. United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1049 (6th Cir. 2012).
189. Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1997).
190. Fisher, 132 F.3d at 1330 (“Keeping someone from doing something is inherent within the concept of restraint, and in this case one coconspirator deliberately kept the security
guard at bay by pointing a gun directly at his head while two others looted the teller counter.”). This quotation has been repeated in numerous cases. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 34 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 607 (4th Cir.
2011); United States v. Miera, 539 F.3d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he obvious presence of handguns ensured the victims’ compliance and effectively prevented them
from leaving the room . . . .”).
192. See Fisher, 132 F.3d at 1329 (“Physical restraint is not limited to physical touching
of the victim.”).
193. 461 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2006).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 34.
196. See id.
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were ‘physically restrained’” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. §
2B3.1(b)(4)(B).197
Similarly, in United States v. Miera, the defendant and his brother
robbed a bank in Utah.198 When they entered the bank, one of the men stood
near the door, waved his gun in the air, and demanded that the bank’s patrons “don’t move” “in a loud, strong voice.”199 The defendant never aimed
the weapon at a specific individual, yet the Tenth Circuit held that such conduct, “in all likelihood . . . had the effect of physically restraining everyone
in his presence.”200 Further justifying the expansive application, the court
reasoned that the defendant “specifically sought to hinder the occupants’
movement”; therefore, he had “physically restrained” them. 201
Given that such conduct qualifies as physical restraint, these circuits
often struggle to articulate a limiting principle for the sentencing enhancement. For example, in United States v. DeLuca, the First Circuit circularly
held that physical restriction of a victim’s freedom of movement was sufficient to constitute physical restraint.202 Similarly, in United States v. Pearson, the Tenth Circuit held that “something more must be done with [a] gun
to physically restrain” an individual than merely displaying or brandishing
the gun.203 Yet, in Miera, after citing this rule, the Tenth Circuit held that the
enhancement applied because the defendant brandished his weapon during a
bank robbery—even though he did not aim it at anyone, make physical contact with a victim, or confine any victims into a closed space.204
Other courts have had placed greater limitations on the enhancement.
The Eighth Circuit has held that the enhancement applies when the offender
leaves the victim with no alternative but to comply with the coercion.205
These courts essentially reason that a coercive threat at gunpoint can have
the same effect as a physical restraint through binding, tying, or locking
away; therefore, when it does, the enhancement ought to apply.206 For example, in United States v. Stevens, the defendants robbed a bank, ushered
the employees into the vault at gunpoint, and then closed the door while the
employees were trapped inside.207 The Court held that the defendant’s con-

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 34–35.
539 F.3d 1232, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1235.
Id.
137 F.3d 24, 38–39 (1st Cir. 1998).
211 F.3d 524, 526–27 (10th Cir. 2000).
Miera, 539 F.3d at 1234–35.
See United States v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id.
580 F.3d 718, 719 (8th Cir. 2009).
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duct warranted application of the physical restraint enhancement because his
actions gave the employees no meaningful alternative but to comply.208
In sum, these circuits hold that brandishing a weapon and ordering a
robbery victim to remain immobile can trigger the physical restraint enhancement. In doing so, these courts tend to focus on the presence of restraint and do not consider U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) to apply only to truly
“physical” restraints, unlike the circuits on the opposite side of the conflict.
Under this approach, the Guidelines’ examples of binding, tying, and locking away are not exhaustive examples of punishable conduct. Ultimately, as
long as the defendant is restrained somehow, the enhancement applies.
IV.

ARGUMENT

The physical restraint enhancement needs a uniform standard of application. In the last twenty-five years, the federal circuits have distorted its
proper meaning and scope by entrenching themselves along opposite lines
of authority.209 Six circuits prefer a strict interpretation; five circuits prefer
an expansive one.210 The Commission has never amended its robbery Guideline to resolve the conflict.211 Such inaction is incompatible with the goals of
federal sentencing, as similarly situated offenders convicted of robbery in
different circuits face a heightened risk of receiving unjustifiably disproportionate punishments.212 Therefore, the disparities must be addressed and
resolved.
The longevity of the conflict, coupled with the likelihood of the Commission’s continued inaction, should inspire the Supreme Court to reconsider the limited role it imposed on itself in the interpretation of specific guideline provisions. The circuit split surrounding the interpretation of the physical restraint enhancement is an appropriate vehicle for the Court to revisit its
decision in Braxton v. United States. Therefore, this Note argues that the
Court—not the Commission—should resolve the conflict among the circuits
by adopting the strict interpretation adopted by the majority of federal circuits. The following paragraphs first explain why the Court should abandon

208. Id. at 721.
209. See supra Section II.
210. See supra Section II.
211. See generally Knitter, supra note 11, at 224–27 (arguing that the Commission should
adopt a definition for physical restraint).
212. Compare United States v. Fisher, 132 F.3d 1327, 1329–30 (10th Cir. 1997)
(“[P]hysical restraint occurs whenever a victim is specifically prevented at gunpoint from
moving, thereby facilitating the crime.”) with United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–
19 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Congress meant for something more than briefly pointing a gun at a
victim and commanding her once to get down to constitute physical restraint, given that nearly all armed bank robberies will presumably involve such acts.”).
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Braxton.213 Then follows the argument that the Court should resolve the conflict by prescribing a definitive interpretation of the scope and application of
the physical restraint enhancement.214
A.

Braxton v. United States: Abandoning the Supreme Court’s “Restrained” Role in Guideline Interpretation

In Braxton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended for the Commission to be principally responsible for resolving conflicting interpretations of specific guideline provisions.215 However, since
that decision the Court has taken the position that the Commission is exclusively responsible for resolving such conflicts.216 The practical effect of the
Court’s reluctance to intervene has been to absolve itself of any responsibility in the shaping of the specific rules used as “the starting point and the
initial benchmark” of every federal criminal sentence.217
The Supreme Court should abandon the limited role it prescribed for itself for three reasons. First, there is no language in the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 to suggest that the Commission is solely responsible for resolving conflicting interpretations of specific guideline provisions.218 Moreover,
there is no evidence in the SRA’s legislative history to suggest that Congress intended the Commission to assume such a responsibility.219 Second,
the Court’s decision to categorically exclude cases in which it would be
tasked with interpreting specific guideline provisions is rooted in an overextension of Braxton’s holding.220 The Court’s continued reliance on it is not
only misguided but also inconsistent with its traditional institutional responsibilities.221 Third, the Commission cannot practicably resolve all conflicting
interpretations of the law it creates on its own.222 The following paragraphs
address each argument in turn.

213. See infra Section IV.A.
214. See infra Section IV.B.
215. 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991).
216. Berman, supra note 94, at 142 (“When an intercircuit conflict concerns differences
in interpretation of guidelines provisions that do not reach constitutional issues, the Supreme
Court has indicated that the Commission has the initial and primary task of addressing and
resolving the conflict.” (quoting 1993 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANN. REP. 14 (1994))).
217. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); see Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S 85, 91 (2007).
218. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at
18 U.S.C §§ 3551 et seq; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98).
219. See generally Stith & Koh, supra note 32, at 284.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 231–36.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 226–30.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 237–46.
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First, Congress never intended for the Commission to shoulder the burden of resolving conflicting interpretations of specific guideline provisions
by itself. As the Braxton Court noted, Congress certainly intended the
Commission to play an important role in resolving circuit conflict.223 Otherwise, it would not have granted the Commission both the power and responsibility to “periodically review and revise . . . the guidelines” or to decide
which amendments are to be given retroactive effect.224 But this language
cannot be fairly read to suggest that Congress expected the Commission to
have the exclusive responsibility of correcting the misapplication of the law
it creates. Nor does any evidence in the SRA’s legislative history support
such a proposition.225 Ultimately, if Congress expected the Supreme Court to
abandon perhaps its most important and traditional institutional responsibility, then one might expect the legislature to make that point clear. In the
SRA, it did not.
Moreover, it is unlikely that Congress intended for the Supreme Court
to abdicate its interpretative responsibility in light of the fact that the Commission’s duty to review and revise the law it promulgates is unremarkable
in American administrative law.226 Numerous federal agencies share with
the Commission the same or similar responsibilities, with respect to the regulations they promulgate.227 However, the Supreme Court has often resolved
conflicting interpretations of other federal regulations.228 It is only the
Guidelines that are categorically exempt from Supreme Court review. As
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito explained regarding the Commission,
“no other federal agency . . . has ever performed a role anything like it.”229
223. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348–50 (1991).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 944(o)–(p).
225. DAWINDER S. SIDHU, SENTENCING GUIDELINES ABSTENTION 33 (2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3950703 (“Moreover, there is simply nothing in the legislative
history or the SRA to suggest that Congress intended for the Court to completely surrender its
traditional role to the Commission, or for the Court to do anything different than it does for
Congress or agencies in the context of relevant splits.”).
226. See id. at 35–40.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991) (resolving a circuit split over a
Health and Human Services regulation); N.L.R.B v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 762
(1969) (resolving a circuit split over a National Labor and Relations Board regulation); Mass.
Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 237 (1964) (resolving a circuit
split over a Maritime regulation); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 301 (1967) (resolving a circuit split over an IRS regulation); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 529–30
(1978) (resolving a circuit split over a Department of Treasury regulation); Ehlert v. United
States, 402 U.S. 99, 101 (1971) (resolving a circuit split over a Selective Service regulation);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 37 (1964) (resolving a circuit split over
Federal Power Commission regulation); Household Credit Servs. v. Pfenning, 541 U.S. 232,
235 (2004) (resolving a circuit split over a Federal Reserve Board regulation).
229. Alito, supra note 106, at 168.
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Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court’s role with respect to other federal
agencies with similar authority, it is unlikely that Congress intended the
Commission to become the “Guidelines Supreme Court”230 or for the actual
Supreme Court to abandon its role in clarifying and improving federal sentencing law.
Second, the Court’s practice of categorically refusing to interpret specific guideline provisions is rooted in an overexpansion of Braxton’s holding. In Braxton, the Court held that the Commission was principally responsible for resolving circuit conflicts.231 The Court did not hold that the Commission was exclusively responsible for maintaining the consistent application of the law it creates.232 Yet, since Braxton, the Supreme Court has not
taken a single case involving a disputed guideline provision. Additionally,
the practice of declining review for disputed guideline provisions takes
Braxton out of context. In Braxton, the Court declined to resolve a circuit
split surrounding a specific guideline provision principally because the
Commission had already begun amending the specific provision in dispute.233 However, that decision has somehow “morphed . . . into the broad
position that the Court always decline to address circuit court conflicts concerning the Guidelines regardless of whether the Commission is addressing
the same issue.”234
The Court’s position regarding guideline interpretation conflicts not
only with its treatment of other federal regulations but also with its own
institutional responsibilities. As the Court in Braxton noted, a “principal
purpose” of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction is to resolve conflicting interpretations of federal law.235 Yet, the Guidelines are the only exception.236
Given their importance as the “starting point and the initial benchmark” of
every federal criminal sentence, the Supreme Court should be involved in
shaping their development.237 In other words, the Guidelines should not be
treated as a separate class of federal law that is categorically exempt from
Supreme Court review.
Third, the Commission cannot practicably ensure consistent and accurate application of the law it creates by itself. Under the SRA, the Commission requires a quorum to take action.238 The Commission is supposed to

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Berman, supra note 94, at 142.
500 U.S. 344, 347–49 (1991).
See id.
Id.
SIDHU, supra note 225, at 23.
Braxton, 500 U.S. at 347.
See Alito, supra note 106, at 168; Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
28 U.S.C. § 994(a).

2022]

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

589

have seven voting members; therefore, at least four members are needed.239
However, the Commission has lacked a quorum for nearly three years, leaving it powerless to amend the Guidelines.240 As of the writing of this Note,
six of the seven possible seats on the Commission are vacant.241 Therefore, it
makes little sense for the Supreme Court to provide such extreme deference
to the Commission while it is inoperative.
Even when the Commission has had a quorum, it has been slow to
242
act. Perhaps the most obvious example here is that it has failed to revise
the robbery Guideline in the last twenty-five years, notwithstanding a deep
circuit split over the interpretation of the physical restraint enhancement.243
And when the Commission does amend the Guidelines, the process is cumbersome and time-consuming, often taking years.244
Despite its unresponsiveness, proponents of the Commission’s primacy
with respect to the resolution of circuit conflict often tout the Commission’s
purported efficiency.245 The reasoning follows that the Commission is better
suited to resolve circuit conflict because it is an independent agency comprised of sentencing experts; thus, it ought to be more efficient because it
operates outside the political influences246 of Congress and is unconstrained
by the sluggishness of the judiciary. Yet, as of writing this Note, the Com239. Id. § 991(a).
240. Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Supreme Court’s Criminal Justice Blind Spot, HILL, (Dec. 1,
2021, 7:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/583467-the-supreme-courts-criminaljustice-blind-spot?rl=1.
STATES
SENT’G
COMM’N,
241. See
Organization,
UNITED
https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/organization; Madison Alder, Near-Vacant Sentencing Panel Gives Biden Chance for Fresh Start, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 28, 2021, 3:46 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/near-vacant-sentencing-panel-gives-bidenchance-for-fresh-start; Nate Raymond, U.S. Sentencing Panel’s Last Member Breyer Urges
11, 2021, 7:27 PM),
Biden to
Revive Commission, REUTERS (Nov.
https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-sentencing-panels-last-member-breyer-urgesbiden-revive-commission-2021-11-11/.
242. See generally Stith & Koh, supra note 32.
243. See supra Section III.
244. See U. S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 36 (“By statute, no later than May 1st,
the Commission must submit the amendments it has voted to promulgate along with ‘reasons
for amendment’ (contained in Appendix C to the Guidelines Manual) to Congress, which has
180 days to decide whether to modify or disapprove them. If Congress does not pass legislation (signed by the President) modifying or disapproving amendments by November 1st, the
amendments become effective on that date. On rare occasions, Congress authorizes the
Commission to promulgate ‘emergency amendments’ which can be passed on an expedited
basis outside of the regular amendment cycle.”).
245. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 97, at 838–41.
246. Arguments favoring Commission primacy in resolving circuit splits often suffer the
taint of a mistakenly rosy understanding of the Commission’s political insulation. See, e.g.,
Bowman, supra note 62, at 236 (“[T]he architects of the [SRA] miscalculated and created a
sentencing structure almost perfectly designed for capture and manipulation by the political
branches.”).
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mission has been powerless—literally incapable of fulfilling its statutory
duties—for the third straight year.247
The Supreme Court can no longer afford to provide such extreme deference to the Commission. The time has come for it to reexamine its handsoff policy with respect to the interpretation of specific guideline provisions.
The Court should do so because its deference to the Commission is required
by neither the SRA nor a fair reading of Braxton, and the Commission is
incapable of practicably fulfilling its duties.248 By taking a more active role
in shaping the rules that affect every federal criminal sentence, the Supreme
Court would not only begin to carve an appropriate role for itself in guidelines interpretation but also would work to further the goals of federal sentencing by eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparities. Ultimately, the
resolution of the conflict surrounding the scope and application of the physical restraint sentencing enhancement provides an appropriate vehicle for the
Court to reconsider its role in guideline interpretation.
B.

Resolving the Circuit Split in Favor of a Narrow Interpretation

The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit conflict surrounding the
interpretation of the physical restraint enhancement in favor of a narrow
construction. Specifically, the Court should adopt the strict textual interpretation used by the majority of the circuits.249 It should do so for three reasons. First, the narrow interpretation is more consistent with the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and its accompanying definition. Second, the narrow interpretation more accurately reflects the purpose of enhanced punishment and the seriousness of the offense. Third, the expansive
interpretation is unnecessarily punitive.
First, the narrow interpretation is more consistent with the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and its accompanying definition. The
Commission’s use of the modifier “physical,” as well as the examples of
binding, tying, and locking up, illustrate that the rule intended to punish
offenders who restrict their victims’ freedom of movement through physical
contact or some form of physical confinement.250 Because the Guidelines’
examples are best understood as illustrations of the type of conduct punishable under the physical restraint enhancement, it is apparent the type of restraint that occurs when an offender commands the victim to “get down” is
qualitatively distinct from what the Commission sought to punish.251 There247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 233.
See Section III.A.
See United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001).
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fore, the act of brandishing a weapon and ordering the victim to “get down,”
without more, should not trigger the enhancement.
Second, the narrow interpretation more accurately reflects the purpose
of enhanced punishment and the seriousness of the offense. Sentencing enhancements are designed to provide additional punishment for conduct that
aggravates, rather than constitutes, the underlying criminal offense.252 Here,
the Guidelines’ examples are wholly independent of the baseline offense of
robbery. However, when the physical restraint enhancement is understood to
include conduct that is typical of most robberies, the rule loses its narrow
purpose and begins to swallow the underlying elements of the offense itself.253 In other words, one can expect an armed robber to brandish a weapon
and then say, “Put your hands up,” or “Don’t move.” As the Second Circuit
explained in Anglin, “[i]t would require a quixotic robber to display his gun,
and then say to the tellers or bank customers, ‘this is a holdup, but feel free
to move about the bank, and if any of you have to leave for an appointment
elsewhere, that’s fine.’”254
Similarly, the narrow interpretation more accurately reflects the seriousness of the offense. This is because the physical restraint enhancement is
designed to punish specific aggravating conduct not typical of most robberies. However, when it is interpreted expansively, it is at risk of no longer
operating as a sentencing enhancement but instead as a potentially automatic
increase of the defendant’s base offense level from twenty to twenty-two.255
This is because most armed robberies involve the offender threatening or
coercing the victim into moving to a specific location, such as lying down
on the floor. Accordingly, unless the robbery occurred in a vacant structure,
it is difficult to imagine when the enhancement would not apply under an
expansive interpretation.256
Third, under the expansive interpretation, when U.S.S.G. §
2B3.1(b)(4)(B) is applied to conduct typical of most robberies, it is unnecessarily punitive. In these instances, the defendant receives additional punishment not only for conduct beyond the scope of the rule but also for conduct
that, in effect, constitutes the underlying crime of armed robbery.257 While
the two-level upward adjustment sounds relatively mild, it has significant
consequences for the defendant, who is subjected to additional months—
often years—of incarceration because of its application. Moreover, it is im252. See United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 1999).
253. E.g., Parker, 241 F.3d at 1118–19.
254. Anglin, 169 F.3d at 165.
255. Id. (“If the government’s interpretation was correct, virtually every robbery would
be subject to the 2-level enhancement for physical restraint unless it took place in unoccupied
premises.”).
256. See id.
257. See id.
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portant to realize that the upward adjustment is only rarely applied in isolation. Typically, it is applied in tandem with other related sentencing enhancements, such as the five-point upward adjustment for brandishing a
weapon during the commission of the offense. In these situations, the defendant is not only additionally punished for conduct typical of most robberies but also punished twice for it.258
V. CONCLUSION
The physical restraint enhancement has long needed a uniform standard
of application. The Commission’s failure to ensure a uniform standard has
undermined the purposes and goals of federal sentencing. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should take a more active role in the shaping of federal sentencing policy by interpreting specific guideline provisions. In doing so, the
Court should interpret U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) narrowly in order to resolve the long-standing circuit split. This interpretation would not only preserve the sentencing enhancement’s narrow purpose but would prevent unnecessarily punitive sentences, unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the
inconsistent application of federal law.
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